In my previous post a few days ago, I mention a range of emerging research in moral injury. I think this field may be quite important for expanding the field of reflection in theological ethics, but I’ll be getting to that a bit later. I wanted to dwell for a moment on a phenomena that I’ve observed in the literature which points at a hazard in interdisciplinary research that is well worth our attention, particularly for scholars who are working across humanities / science / social-science boundaries like I often am.

In working with the category of moral injury, and also more broadly around trauma studies, I’ve noted a desire by activists (with whom I have much common cause) to make the condition as broadly applicable as possible. You can see this in the claims that all persons living in our societies experience moral injury and trauma as a result of our enclosure and oppression in neoliberal societies. This is a difficult challenge for humanists interfacing with trauma studies, particularly if your scholarly reflection doesn’t touch down on personal experience with the condition you’re probing and appropriating for wider reflection. And indeed, I’ve seen this work out in much broader engagement with scientific concepts, around ecological concepts, biological theories of evolution, cognition in other-than-human animals and plants.

There is something about these concepts which can be uniquely compelling – they draw us in and provide a catalyst for thinking and reflecting on a context where we want to sharpen the focus of our audiences. In some ways, it might be said that they can serve as generative metaphors, opening up new kinds of expansive or transitive thought. But the conceptual origins of generative metaphors can be various – a concept can be porous, open ended or expansive from the start. Some concepts arise from material conditions which are quite specific and can be defined forensically. Of course, some of these forensic definitions can themselves carry a level of construction and fiction, to be fair. This all relates to the different possible characteristics of a source domain, and the ways that we interface with those different characteristics. I’ve noticed a particular appetite in writing about forms of crisis and mental distress (perhaps arising from the intellectual structures of psychoanalysis) to work expansively with categories of distress and situate them in all of our everyday lives. I’ve also noticed sharply negative reactions from those persons who experience these conditions in the sharp form as a form of oppression. This can be seen in the push-back against more expansive understandings of autism and neurodivergence, shown in the expression of fears that mainstreaming concepts will lead to an erosion of social and biomedical support for those who have meaningful high support needs. In a similar way, I’ve seen fears that appropriation of concepts of trauma may lead to an erosion of understanding trauma as an exceptional situation. Do we all experience trauma? I don’t really think so, actually. We all experience hardship, perhaps even some levels of suffering, but to use the word “trauma” to define these situations which already have other terms (which perhaps we have become desensitised to) does indeed risk, I think, a diversion of attention. Speaking about forms of trauma which are disabling can suddenly provide difficult when the background context of conversation assumes that everyone is experiencing and attempting to surmount these matters.

There’s a risk that reacting negatively to these forms of generalisation and appropriation of the metaphors of trauma can work in service to forms of positivism. In a desire to bring a rejoinder, we can reach for tools which offer specificity, e.g. DSM diagnostic pathways, and other features of contemporary experimental psychological research. But is this the right kind of specificity? And is reaching in this way, e.g. as a valorous gatekeeper, the right way to do this? I don’t think so. There are forms of specification which can draw us deeper into personalising our accounts of suffering and oppression, though these are hard to do as they require levels of disclosure and communication. There are also ways of doing this work which adds further texture to our accounts of the everyday. It may also be important for us to work with more highly specified theodicies – avoiding lazy characterisations of evil which use broad brushstrokes or work in overly encompassing ways. That’s not to say that we shouldn’t use the category of evil, but that we need to really unpack what we mean and how that applies. It’s also possible that, looking to the broader interdisciplinary working category, that some attention to forms of source domain for our metaphors may reveal that there are concepts which commend and even advertise themseves as supportive of broader appropriation, which might serve the cause of justice by being more widely deployed. Similarly, it’s equally possible that we may need to proceed more sensitively and carefully in our use of concepts. This is especially difficult, I think, for scholars who are personally experiencing oppression or suffering for the first time as this initial experience can carry such sharpness (given the lack of background to provide a sense of bas relief) that we can lose the ability to determine whether our appropriations are inappropriate. For this, I think, we need to rely on more experienced hands – and perhaps not just human ones.

If we approach something like moral injury or complex PTSD less in terms of a forensically defined diagnostic pathway, and more as a metaphor which can be more freely appropriated, we can sometimes lose the ability to define thresholds of experience, that is, when a person experiences the phenomenon without the persistent experience of bodily harm or a certain level of oppression which proves disabling